Alcázar, L., Abdala, M. A. y Shirley, M. (2002). The Buenos Aires water concession. En M. Shirley (Ed.), Thirsting for efficiency: the economics and politics of urban water system reform (pp. 65-101). Washington, DC: World Bank.

In this chapter we explore the circumstances in the water sector and the political and institutional factors that led Argentina to implement the concession. Second, the reform has been widely acclaimed for generating major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient operation of the company, and a reduction in waste. What makes these improvements especially striking is that the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9% reduction in water system tariffs. The chapter analyzes the features of the contract that explain performance improvements, and considers how institutions affected outcomes. Finally, the Buenos Aires case is of interest because the contract was renegotiated in 1997, provoking criticisms of the original bid and the regulation. We describe these revisions and measure the extent to which Buenos Aires was better off because of the concession, with and without the renegotiation. The chapter concludes with lessons for reform design.